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Claartje van Dam*
In many ways, informal governance can be seen as the glue that holds the
cumbersome and contradictory system of EU governance together.1
4.1 Introduction
Over time, the EU legal framework which governs the EU institutions, the Member States
and the citizens has expanded, evolved, and gained in complexity.2 This legal framework
is the product of over sixty years of European integration, during which the European
Union has developed into a system of 28 Member States, has been subject to processes of
democratisation andhas expanded its range of competences, going far beyond the regulation
of economic issues.3
Throughout the European integration process, outside or in the shadow of the legal
framework, non-binding and informal rules have come to play an important role.4At some
places such measures are mentioned in the EU treaties.5 Mostly, however, it concerns
institutionalized practices that do not have an explicit basis in the legal text.6 One of these
practices is the issuing of non-legally binding instruments that guide and assist theMember
* I would like to thank Professor Stefaan Van den Bogaert, ProfessorWimVoermans and Nicolas Clisson for
their valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
1 T. Christiansen, A. Follesdal & S. Piattoni. ‘Informal Governance in the European Union: An Introduction’,
in T. Christiansen & S. Piattoni (Eds.), Informal Governance in the European Union, Edward Elgar, Chel-
tenham, 2003, p. 5.
2 J. P. Jacqué, Droit Institutionnel de l’Union Européenne, Dalloz, Paris, 2012, p. 1 and p. 24.
3 H.Hofmann,G. C. Rowe&A. Türk,Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, OxfordUniversity
Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 3-4.
4 Christiansen, Follesdal & Piattoni, 2003.
5 For instance, in the field of social policy, Art. 156 provides for the establishment of guidelines and indicators.
A similar provision can be found in the area of public health (Art. 168(2)). Art. 288 makes explicit reference
to recommendations and opinions. Although these instrumentsmay have external effect, they are not legally
binding. See Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 549.
6 Cf. J. H. Jans, S. Prechal & R. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law, Europa Law Publishing,
Groningen, 2015, p. 12.
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States in the implementation of EU legislation,7 hereinafter referred to as ‘Commission
guidance’.
This chapter explores the relationship between Commission guidance and the legal
framework governing the implementation of EU law.What is the role of these documents
in practice, and under what conditions can the use of guidance contribute to the imple-
mentation of EU legislation by the Member States? Is the use of guidance documents – in
the current state of the European integration – fit for the future?
Raising these questions seems all the more relevant in the context of the discussions
on better regulation that currently take centre stage in EU politics.8 At a time where dis-
course and perception prevails that the European Union is doing too much and unneces-
sarily meddles with Member States affairs,9 it seems appropriate to rethink the use of
Commission guidance. On the one hand, the highly informal character makes guidance
documents an appealing and effective implementation tool that facilitates implementation
processes and promotes harmonized implementation practices. At the same time, the lack
of a principled approach towards the issuing and use of guidance documents carries the
risk that the use of guidance documentsmay come to lead a life of its own, raising questions
and problems in light of principles of law and better regulation.
The questionwhether and towhat extentCommission guidance should bemade subject
to regulatory standards thus seems pertinent and one that, moreover, deserves to be
addressed in light of the important place of better regulation issues on the agenda of the
Dutch presidency of the Council of the European Union.10 However, the answer to this
question is not so straightforward. When the issuing and use of guidance documents
becomes subject to regulatory controls or procedures, this might be to the detriment of
the informal character of guidance documents. The existence of an informal sphere, even
within formal structures, is of considerable or perhaps even vital importance in a rigid
legal system such as that of the European Union. Striving for the situation in which there
is room for informality whilst legal principles are respected is the ideal; in reality choices
7 This definition is based on the definition used by Senden.However, the definition I employ ismore confined
in the sense that it focuses on guidance documents that address the implementing powers of the Member
States in the implementation of EU law. These guidance documents will mostly fall within the category of
‘interpretative guidance’ and the guidance documents that address the discretionary powers of the Member
States in the implementation of EU law. See L. Senden, ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More
Stringent Control’, European Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2013, pp. 59-61.
8 See European Commission, Better Regulation for better results – An EU agenda, COM(2015)215 final,
19 May 2015. See also European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines SWD(2015)111 final, 19 May
2015.
9 See, e.g. D. Murray, ‘Euroscepticism is Growing All over Europe. Europhiles May Find That Ever Looser
Union Is the Only Future for the EU’, The Spectator, 3 October 2015, available at: <www.specta-
tor.co.uk/2015/10/euroscepticism-is-growing-all-over-europe/>.
10 Letter from Minister Koenders: ‘Agenda for the General Affairs Council during the Netherlands EU Presi-
dency’, 15 January 2016, p. 2, available at: <http://english.eu2016.nl/documents/letters/16/01/15/letter-from-
minister-koenders-agenda-for-the-general-affairs-council-during-the-netherlands-eu-presidency>.
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need to be made and the more compelling question perhaps concerns where the right
‘balance’ can be found.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first part describes the main features of the
EU legal system, and identifies some vulnerabilities related to it. The second part first
explains why and in what ways guidance documents play an important complementary
role – largely due to their informal character – to the legislative framework that governs
the implementation of EU legislation. Subsequently, it outlines some of the unintended
consequences or risks related to the use of guidance documents. Finally, the third part
draws some concluding remarks and addresses EUpolicymakers by providing recommen-
dations on how to make Commission guidance fit for the future.
4.2 The Features and Vulnerabilities of the EU Legal System
Through the issuing of guidance documents the EuropeanCommission assists theMember
States in the implementation of the EU legislation. What are the functions of guidance
documents in relation to this legal framework? What explains and justifies the mere exis-
tence of guidance documents? And why is the informal character of guidance documents
important for these functions to be fulfilled?
The answer to these questions is closely related to the character of the legislative
framework as exposed in the EU treaties and secondary legislation that governs the
implementation of EU policies. This paragraph therefore outlines the main features of the
EU legislative framework and identifies some flaws or vulnerabilities whichmight hamper
an effective implementation of EU legislation
4.2.1 Member State Administrations: Distant, Complex and Heterogeneous
Entities
The implementation of the legislative rules that are adopted at the level of the European
Union is the responsibility of the Member States.11 Article 291 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that the Member States must adopt all
measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts.12 The
implementation of EU law not only requires the adoption of national legislativemeasures,
but also involves the adoption of individual decisions, actions of enforcement as well as
factual conduct or measures.13
11 Article 291(1) TFEU; Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 13.
12 See also Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 13 and n. 39.
13 In this chapter the concept of implementation is understood in a broadmanner, encompassing the transpo-
sition, interpretation, application and enforcement of EU law. Compare S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law,
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This system encompassing a decentralized implementation of Union law as reflected
in the EU treaties, does not mean that there is no role for the European Commission. In
the first place, the European Commission itself disposes of implementing powers where
these powers have been conferred by the Member States.14 Secondly, in its role as the
guardian of the EU treaties, the European Commission acts as a watchdog over the day-
to-day application of EU law at the level of the Member States.15 As ultimum remedium
the European Commission disposes of the power to launch an infringement procedure.16
Thirdly, the European Commission is ultimately responsible for the implementation of
the EU budget.17 To this end the European Commission also disposes of supervisory
powers. For instance, where the EU budget is implemented under shared management by
theMember States, the EuropeanCommission has the power to apply financial corrections
when deficiencies in the implementation of the EU budget occur.18
Thus, despite the decentralized implementation ofUnion law, implementing responsi-
bilities are attributed to the European Commission as well as to the Member State
administrations.19 In this system of shared administration20 a constructive cooperation,
dialogue, communication, and exchange of information between the two administrative
branches is necessary and even vital to the smooth functioning of the EU administrative
system. However, in practice, a gap or distance may exist between the European Commis-
sion and national administrative authorities. According to Möllers, for the European
Commission ‘the administrations of the member states are distant, complex, and very
heterogeneous entities in a vast administrative space’.21WhenmonitoringMember States
practices, the European Commission is largely dependent on the provision of information
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 5-6; J. Luijendijk & L.A.J. Senden, ‘De Gelaagde Doorwerking
van Europese Administratieve Soft Law in de Nationale Rechtsorde’, SEW, Vol. 59, 2011, p. 315.
14 SeeArticle 291(2) TFEU.Where uniform implementing conditions for implementing legally bindingUnion
acts are needed, implementing powers can be conferred upon the European Commission and exceptionally
upon the Council.
15 Article 17(1) TEU; N. Nugent, The government and politics of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 2010, p. 130; See also Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 709; B. Steunenberg, ‘Is Big Brother
Watching? Commission Oversight of the National Implementation of EU Directives’, European Union Pol-
itics, Vol. 11, 2010, p. 359-380.
16 Article 258 TFEU;M. Ballesteros et al., Tools for Ensuring Implementation and Application of EU Law and
Evaluation of their Effectiveness, European Parliament – Directorate General for Internal Policies – Policy
Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2013, p. 15; Jacqué, 2012, p. 387.
17 Article 317 TFEU; Article 53 of Regulation 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ 2012 L 298/1.
18 See Article 59(6) of Regulation 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012
on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ 2012 L 298/1; Hofmann, Rowe &
Türk, 2011, p. 347.
19 C. Blumann & L. Dubouis, Droit Institutionnel de l’Union Européenne, LexisNexis, Paris, 2010, p. 482 and
pp. 491-493.
20 Jans, Prechal & Widdershoven, 2015, p. 7.
21 C. Möllers, The Three Branches. A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2013, p. 188.
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by the Member States.22 Several factors might hamper the transfer of information from
the Member States to Brussels. Indeed, the transfer of information not only depends on
the knowledge of theMember States on implementation practices but largely also on their
willingness to properly inform theEuropeanCommission on their implementationpractices
and the problems they encounter.23 The lack of information on what implementing prob-
lems are encountered at the national level makes it difficult for the European Commission
to adopt implementingmeasures that ‘fit’within the administrative reality in theMember
States. Conversely, at the national level the European Commission could be perceived as
distanced andunaware of the implementation problems that are encountered at the national
level. This potential gap or distance between the EuropeanCommission andMember State
administrations could therefore be considered a vulnerability of the legal framework gov-
erning the implementation of Union law.
4.2.2 ‘What Does It Mean?’ The Lack of Clarity of EU Legislation
The EU legislative framework is composed of legislative acts (or ‘basic acts’) adopted
according to the ordinary legislative procedure,24 and of delegated and implementing acts
that constitutes ‘non-legislative’ rulemaking or ‘subordinate legislation’.25 In order for the
EU legal framework to be correctly understood and implemented at the national level, the
rules need to be comprehensible, clear and practical to implement.26
However, in practice EU legislation27 is often accused of having a vague, complex and
ambiguous character. The lack of clarity of EU legislation is not surprising in light of the
fact that EU legislation is often the result of political compromise. The process of
enlargement towards nowadays 28 Member States and the process towards the European
Parliament becoming a fully recognized co-legislator have largely influenced the character
of EU legislative provisions.28 Furthermore, jurisprudential guidance provided by theCourt
of Justice of the European Union is not available for any question, is often case specific or
open to multiple interpretations. Questions on the interpretation of provisions in EU leg-
islation inevitably arise.29
22 Nugent, 2010, pp. 130-131.
23 Cf. Nugent 2010, p. 131.
24 See Article 289(1)(3) TFEU and Article 294 TFEU. As an exception legislative acts may also be the result of
special legislative procedures (see article 289(2) TFEU). See also Hofmann, Rowe and Türk 2011, p. 94.
25 Article 290 and 291 TFEU; Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 524; A. Alemanno & A. Meuwese. ‘Impact
Assessment of EU Non-Legislative Rulemaking; The Missing Link in “New Comitology”’, European Law
Journal, Vol. 19, 2013, pp. 76-92.
26 Cf. European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines SWD(2015)111 final, 19 May 2015, p. 32.
27 In this article, the term ‘EU legislation’ is used both for basic acts as well as for delegated and implementing
acts.
28 Cf. Jacqué 2012, p. 387.
29 Cf. Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 570.
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Thus, the lack of clarity and ensuing uncertainty as regards the proper implementation
of EU legislation at the level of theMember Statesmay be regarded as a second vulnerability
inherent to the system of decentralized implementation. Despite the ‘better legislation’
agenda that seeks to achieve clear, simple and straightforward legislation, the process of
democratisation is likely to be reflected in EU legislative acts in the future.
4.2.3 United in Too Much Diversity?
The decentralized implementation of Union law may be seen as an expression of the pre-
served sovereignty of theMember States.30 It is for theMember States to choose themeans
and to designate the national competent authorities by which EU law is implemented.31
Furthermore, leaving room for manoeuvre allows for the implementing measures to be
adjusted to suit the circumstances of a specific case and accordingly to ensure the optimum
achievement of policy objectives.32 However, at the same time the room for manoeuvre
left to the Member States may be regarded as a weakness or vulnerability that could raise
uncertainty for administrative authorities and that jeopardizes consistent and harmonized
implementation practices.
In the first place, the system whereby Union law is implemented by 28 different
Member States with different administrative cultures, traditions and practices, may lead
to unnecessary divergences in implementation practices and results.33Toomanydivergences
in the implementation of EU law are generally considered to lead to disintegration and
mayhamper the achievement of policy objectives.34The harmonizing effect of EU legislation
is considered necessary for greater integration and to strengthen the capacity of the
European Union to govern, especially in competition driven areas where equal chances
and opportunities for the addressees of EU laws are fundamental to the EU project.35
Secondly, more flexibility and more room to manoeuvre for the Member States often
impliesmore uncertainty for the administrative authorities charged with the implementa-
tion of EU legislation. Administrative authorities tend to prefer to have clear and
straightforward rules onwhat is expected from the obligations laid down in EU legislation,
30 R. Mehdi, ‘L’Autonomie Institutionnelle et Procédurale et le Droit Administratif’, in J. B. Auby & J. Dutheil
de la Rochère (Eds.), Droit Administratif Européen, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 687.
31 Blumann & Dubouis, 2010, p. 481.
32 This approach is reflected in European Commission, Guidance document on the strict protection of animal
species of Community interest under the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, February 2007, p. 20.
33 J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law, London: Office for Official Publications of the European Com-
munities and Sweet and Maxwell, 2006, p. 56.
34 B.G. Peters & J. Pierre. ‘Governance Approaches’, in A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European Integration
Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 102.
35 Schwarze, 2006, p. 51.
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not to run the risk of being confronted with an infringement procedure or, if applicable,
sanctions or other corrective measures of the European Commission.
Thus, a tension exists between the flexibility and room for manoeuvre provided for in
EU legislation, on the one hand, and the need for certainty and clarity for authorities
charged with the implementation of EU legislation, on the other hand. In view of the
political objectives to focus on the ‘big’ questions36 as well as the increased heterogeneity
in the European Union with 28 Member States, EU legislation is likely to increasingly
provide for flexibility in the implementation of EU legislation.
4.2.4 Conclusion: An Effective Implementation at Risk?
The EU legal system reveals vulnerabilities and contradictions, a conclusion which is not
surprising perhaps in light of the fact that today the EuropeanUnion comprises 28Member
States. The distance between the Member States and the Commission services could
hamper the exchange of information between the two administrative branches. Contrary
to the principles of the better regulation agenda, EU legislation often contains vague and
ambiguous provisions and/or is characterized by a high level of complexity. The increased
room for divergence and flexibility contrasts with the need for clear and straightforward
rules of administrative authorities and, moreover, might lead to unnecessary divergences
in implementation practices.
These vulnerabilities inherent to the legal framework may lead to deficiencies in
implementation processes and practices. In the EU legal system the smooth and effective
implementation at the national level is of utmost importance for the perceived legitimacy
of EU policies and processes.37 Does Commission guidance constitute a welcoming
implementing tool that could help to address and overcome the vulnerabilities to the EU
legislative framework?
4.3 Commission Guidance as Informal Implementation Tool: Vice or
Virtue?
The introduction of this chaptermentioned the informal character of guidance documents.
Before reflecting on the importance of informality as well as the dangers related to it, I
briefly discuss in the ways in which the informal character of guidance documents reveals
36 J.C. Juncker,A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political
Guidelines for the next European Commission, 15 July 2014, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/priori-
ties/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines_en.pdf>.
37 Ballesteros et al., 2013, p. 17.
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itself by comparing guidance documents to their counterparts: the Union secondary law
instruments provided for in the treaties of the European Union.38
The formalities of EU legal acts are linked to the adoption process, the outcome, and
the use in practice.39 The informalities of Commission guidance become visible when one
compares Commission guidance with legislative acts on these three aspects.40 First, Com-
mission guidance lacks a clear and explicit legal basis in the EU treaties, and is not adopted
according to a fixed, treaty based adoption procedure.41 Secondly, in terms of ‘outcome’
Commission guidance is informal in the sense that it lacks legally binding force.42 This
promise is often reflected in the text of the guidance documents. For instance, the guidance
document on the concept of obvious error related to the granting of EU agricultural sub-
sidies states:
This document constitutes an opinion given by the Commission services, and
is intended for purposes of general guidance only and is not legally binding.
(…) Furthermore, it is emphasised that Member States have a responsibility
to properly apply agricultural legislation.43
Furthermore, the EU treaties do not require the publication of Commission guidance
documents in the Official Journal of the European Union.44 In practice, Commission
guidance documents are issued under different names, such as Communications, Staff
Working Documents and Interpretative Notes.45 Thirdly, the informal character of Com-
mission guidance expresses itself through the absence of formal, written rules that prescribe
how Commission guidance should be dealt with by governmental actors, among which
are national courts and national authorities.46
38 See for a discussion of these instruments Jans, Prechal & Widdershoven, 2015, p. 11.
39 Compare Pauwelynwho distinguishes among output informality, process informality and actor informality.
Pauwelyn, 2012, pp. 15-22.
40 See for a similar approach to identify informal international lawmaking J. Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International
Lawmaking: Framing the Concept andResearchQuestions’, in J. Pauwelyn, R. A.Wessel & J.Wouters (Eds.),
An Introduction to Informal International Lawmaking, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 15.
41 Luijendijk & Senden, 2011, pp. 319-320; Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 543 and p. 549.
42 Soft law is not attributed legally binding force by the EU Treaties. See Article 288 TFEU; see also Senden,
2013, p. 62.
43 European Commission, Working Document AGR 49533/2002 on the concept of obvious error according
to art. 12 of Commission Regulation (EC) 2419/2001, available at: <http://ies-webarchive-ext.jrc.it/mars/
mars/content/download/805/5287/file/AGR495332002_obvious%20error.pdf>(last accessed on 29 January
2016).
44 Article 297 TFEU. Senden, 2013, p. 68.
45 See Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, pp. 544-566.
46 The absence of formal or written rules regulating the behaviour of political agents is considered a character-
istic of informal governance. J. Mak & J. van Tatenhove, ‘Introduction: Informality in a Future EU’, Perspec-
tives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 7, 2006, p. 3.
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4.3.1 Informality: The Key to the Success of Commission Guidance?
The highly informal character makes guidance documents subject to controversy in legal
literature. For instance, Commission guidance is criticized for the lack of an explicit legal
basis,47 the absence of a pre-established and transparent adoption procedure,48 the limited
judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union,49 and the legal and practical
effects and impacts that guidance can have in practice despite its non-legally binding
character.50
Yet it is the informal character thatmay be regarded as the key to the success of guidance
documents in practice. It is the informal character that makes guidance documents an
appreciated and appealing instrument, for the Member States as well as for the European
Commission. This is witnessed by the fact that in several policy areas, such as the area of
competition law and the area of EU agricultural subsidies, the issuing of guidance docu-
ments has come to be common practice.51 Furthermore, it is largely due to the informal
andnon-binding character that guidance documents are able to address the abovementioned
vulnerabilities in the EU legislative framework.
In the first place, the exchange of views and discussions with experts from theMember
States prior to the finalisation of guidance documents facilitates an informal dialogue
between the services of the EuropeanCommission and the distancednational administrative
authorities.52These discussions often take place in the context of expert groups or committee
meetings, where draft versions of the guidance documents are presented. These discussions
enable dialogue and create a sphere of cooperation and trust rather than of conflict, espe-
cially when the European Commission services prove responsive to the problems
encountered by the Member States and when the Member States deliberately share infor-
mation on their experiences and questions. For instance, in the highly politicized area of
freemovement of persons, Commission guidelines were issued in 2009 in order to address
implementation deficiencies, as a first step, through dialogue rather than through the
opening of infringement procedures.53 To conclude, the issuing of guidance documents
47 Luijendijk & Senden, 2011, p. 350; Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 549.
48 Senden 2013, p. 65.
49 J. Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-legislativeGuidance as aChallenge for EuropeanAdministrative Law’,Common
Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 2011, pp. 329-355.
50 Ştefan, 2013, p. 17.
51 See Ştefan, 2013, p. 67 on the role soft law in the area of competition law; For a discussion of soft law in the
area of EU subsidies see J.E. van den Brink, De uitvoering van Europese Subsidieregelingen in Nederland:
Juridische Knelpunten en Uitdagingen, Kluwer, Deventer, 2012, pp. 267-307.
52 Cf. Hofmann, Rowe and Türk according to whom ‘[t]he dialogic function of these various instruments is,
without doubt, of great importance’. Hofmann, Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 555.
53 European Commission, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of
citizens of the Union and their familymembers tomove and reside freely within the territory of theMember
States, (COM(2009)313 final), 2 July 2009.
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can be considered a means to bridge or at least reduce the distance between the European
Commission and theMember States, a distance which has been characterized as a vulner-
ability inherent to the legislative framework.
Secondly, the informal character of the process prior to the issuing of guidance docu-
ments can be considered suitable for addressing the need for clarification of provisions in
EU legislation, the second vulnerability identified above. Despite prior consultation among
national experts, it is eventually the European Commission who decides upon the content
of the guidance documents. This enables the European Commission to take the remarks
and comments of the Member States into account in so far as this contributes to the pur-
poses of clarifying EU legislation; a formal vote on the final version is not required.
Therefore, the text of guidance documents is less likely to reflect political compromises or
to suffer from a lack of clarity than legislative texts. In this respect, the valuable role of
guidance documents becomes clear in the area of agricultural subsidies and particularly
in the area of direct payments. In this policy area, where legislative instruments have a
highly technical and complex character, guidance documents provide the necessary clarity
to administrative authorities that reduce the risk for financial corrections by following the
guidelines.54
Thirdly, guidance documents could also be considered the appropriate instrument for
providing some coherence and uniformity when flexibility is left to the Member States.55
In view of the political demand for more flexibility, the emphasis on the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as the increased heterogeneity in the European
Union of 28 Member States, the issuing of a guidance document is in many situations
preferable andmore politically acceptable than the adoption of a legally binding act. Indeed,
contrary to a legally binding act, the assumption underlying the issuing of the guidance
documents is that theMember States still have the options of choosing their own path and
of deviating from the guidance provided by the European Commission.56 As a result,
guidance documents are apt to address implementation questions even in areas with a
highly heterogeneous character. For instance, the Species guidance document related to
theHabitatsDirective provides further guidance to the implementation of the requirements
related to the protection of species, without imposing one size fits all solutions.57 Thus,
guidance documents also address the third vulnerability of the EU legislative framework:
the increased room for flexibility left to the Member States in implementation practices.
54 Although of course the risk remains that the CJEU might eventually adopt a different interpretation.
55 Hofmann, Rowe and Türk emphasize that without Commission guidance ‘there would be high level of
unnecessary divergence in approach, technique, and organization (…) across theMember States’. Hofmann,
Rowe & Türk, 2011, p. 570.
56 Eventually, the Member States may have this tested before the Court of Justice. See also Hofmann, Rowe &
Türk, 2011, p. 570.
57 European Commission, Guidance Document on the strict protection of animal species of Community
interest under the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, February 2007, and particularly p. 19 and 20.
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In conclusion, for various reasons Commission guidance documents can be considered
the appropriate instrument for providing the solution for the vulnerabilities inherent to
the EU legislative framework. Commission guidance facilitates an informal dialogue
between the EuropeanCommission and theMember States, is able to provide clarification
on provisions of EU law and promotes a uniform implementation, whilst respecting the
room for manoeuvre of the Member States. The informal and non-binding character of
guidance documents plays an important role in this regard, and makes it an appealing
alternative to the adoption or change of an implementing or delegated act for which the
legislative procedure is to be followed.
4.4 The Use of Commission Guidance in Practice: Giving Rise to
Unintended Consequences?
The previous paragraph outlines how Commission guidance is able to contribute to the
smooth implementation of EU legislation. These promises of Commission guidance are
often reflected in legal and political discourse justifying the issuing of guidance documents.58
However, whilst acknowledging the importance of guidance documents for the functioning
of the EU administrative system, does the use of guidance documents also entail some
risks or give rise to potential unintended consequences that might be at odds with legal
principles governing the implementation of EU legislation? And if so, what lessons can be
drawn for the use of guidance documents in the future? These questions are addressed in
this and the next paragraph.
In the first place, through the use of guidance documents in practice the room for
manoeuvre that the Member States have been granted, may become redefined, confined
or even illusionary. An illustrative example can be found in the area of the Habitats
Directive.59 The District Court of The Hague uses the Species guidance document60 for
defining the scope of the obligation laid down in Article 12 of the Habitats Directive
according to which the Member States have to set up a system of protection.61 By using
the Species guidance document as an interpretation aid, the court in fact shapes the outer
lines or the limits of this obligation that rests on The Netherlands.
58 See e.g. the introduction of European Commission, Working Document AGR 49533/2002 on the concept
of obvious error according to art. 12 of Commission Regulation (EC) 2419/2001, available at: <http://ies-
webarchive-ext.jrc.it/mars/mars/content/download/805/5287/file/AGR495332002_obvious%20error.pdf>
(last accessed on 29 January 2016).
59 Council Directive of 21May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, (EEC)
92/43 OJ 1992 L 206/7.
60 European Commission, Guidance Document on the strict protection of animal species of Community
interest under the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, February 2007, p. 4.
61 District Court of The Hague, 22 May 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:CA0593.
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A second but different example can be found in the area of agricultural subsidies. In
this situation, the Dutch administration strictly adheres to the ‘fifty trees criterion’ laid
down in aWorkingDocument issued by theDirectorate General for Agriculture andRural
Development.62 In line with this criterion, the Dutch administration takes the view that
an agricultural parcel containing more than fifty trees per hectare is, as a general rule, to
be considered ineligible for an EU subsidy.63 The criterion provides further guidance to a
provision in a regulationwhich prescribes that a parcel that contains trees can be considered
eligible for aid provided that agricultural activities can be carried out on the parcel in the
sameway as on parcels without trees in the same area.64By strictly adhering to the European
Commission guidelines, the Dutch administration confines the discretion it has been
granted in the implementation of EU direct payments legislation.65
From these two examples it follows that, through the use of guidance by national courts
and the national administrative authorities, the room for discretion granted by the
underlying legal provision may become redefined or may even become illusionary. The
use of guidance documents does, however, not necessarily mean that the European Com-
mission dictates the outcomes of implementing decisions. The effect of Commission
guidance on the room for discretion of theMember States depends on the type of guidance
and on the use of guidance documents in practice. Nevertheless, the conclusion may be
drawn that the vertical division of competences in the implementation of EU legislation
may become affected by the use of Commission guidance in practice.
Secondly, the use of Commission guidance when implementing EU legislation might
render indiscernible the division of competences between the European Commission and
national authorities. Commission guidance often indirectly and silently influences the way
in which EU law is transposed, interpreted, and applied. As a consequence, there is no
clear, dividing line between the responsibilities of the Member States and those of the
62 See European Commission, Working Document on On-the-spot checks of area according to articles 23-32
of Commission Regulation (EC) 796/2004 (AGRI/60363/2005-REV1), 2005. The document (p. 4) states: ‘In
accordance with Art. 8(1) of R.796/2004, (forage) areas of trees inside an agricultural parcel with density of
more than 50 trees/ha should, as a general rule, be considered as ineligible.’
63 Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, 27 October 2010, ECLI:NL:CBB:2010: BO2425, Para. 2.6; Trade and
Industry Appeals Tribunal, 21 September 2011, Para. 2.3.1. In 2009 the fifty tree criterion was transposed
into a ministerial decree, the Regeling GLB-inkomenssteun 2009. The act was repealed on 1 January 2015,
see Staatscourant 2014, 36127.
64 See Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) 796/2004 of 21 April 2004, OJ 2004 L 141/18, which was later replaced
byArticle 34(4) ofCommissionRegulation (EC) 1122/2009 of 30November 2009,OJ 2009L 316/65 (repealed).
65 The Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal does not accept this practice. The highest administrative
courts consider this practice to be unacceptable for the reason that it runs counter to the very nature of this
working document. The court requires that an individual assessment ismade as prescribed by the underlying
EU subsidy regulation. See Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 27 October 2010, ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:
BO2425, Para. 2.6; Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, 21 September 2011, ECLI:NL: CBB:2011:BU1249,
Para. 2.3.3.
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European Commission. This is problematic from a viewpoint of accountability.66 The
example on the use of the fifty tree criterion by Dutch administrative authorities is, again,
illustrative. By using this criterion when deciding upon the eligibility of an agricultural
parcel, the guidance issued by the European Commission influences the decision taken by
the Dutch administrative authority. The final beneficiary is only confronted with the
decision taken by the national administrative authority. The guidelines upon which the
decisions are based remain invisible, hidden behind the administrative practices of national
authorities. Although the issuing of the guidelines can be understood and explained in
light of the final responsibility of the European Commission for the implementation of
the EU budget,67 it is the national authorities that will be held responsible for the decision
when challenged before a national court. The symbiosis of European and national practices
in the implementation and application of Union legislation contrasts with the principle
of accountability, according to which it should be clear which measures are the result of
European obligations and which measures are national measures.68
Thirdly and finally, the issuing of Commission guidance might also raise questions
about rather than provide answers to the proper interpretation and implementation of EU
legislation. This unintended consequence could arise for multiple reasons. In the first
place, when drafted in a vague or unclearmanner, Commission guidance does not achieve
the objective of ‘clarifying’ the underlying legal provisions. In contrast, it probably raises
questions on the side of national authorities when implementing EU legislation, or might
even invite them to disregard the guidance document in question. Secondly, questions
may also arise when national courts or the Court of Justice of the European Union adopt
a different interpretation than the interpretation provided for in Commission guidance
documents. Although this ‘risk’ on the proper interpretation of EU legislation is inherent
to the implementation and application of EU law in day-to-day practices, the existence of
multiple interpretations could raise confusion and uncertainty as regards of the status of
guidance documents. Thirdly, uncertainty might arise when too many or contradictory
guidance documents are adopted. This risk particularly arises in areas where guidance
documents are used often and in different forms. For instance in the area of EU subsidies,
guidance is provided for in letters to theMember States, working documents, interpretative
notes, guidance documents, technical guidance documents as well as on the Wikicap
website. These multiple sources of guidance may render it impossible for actors to have
66 Möllers distinguishes between, on the one hand, democratic accountability, meaning that citizens can hold
the public authority politically responsible for decisions that affect them, and, on the other hand, legal
accountability, which requires that decisions of public authority can be challenged in court. Möllers, 2013,
p. 191.
67 See Article 317 TFEU. See section 4.2.1 above.
68 This principle is also reflected in the better regulation objectives. See for instance, the EuropeanCommission
Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation. Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2015) 216 final, 19 May 2015, p. 8.
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an overview of, let alone consult, the various guidance documents provided by the European
Commission and may have a confusing rather than clarifying effect on implementation
processes. Moreover, in this way the use of guidance documents may add to the image of
the European Union being responsible for producing administrative burden and overreg-
ulation.
To conclude, the issuing of guidance documentsmay trigger unintended consequences
that could affect the legitimacy of the use of guidance documents. Although this conclusion
does not call into question the valuable role of Commission guidance as informal imple-
mentation tool, it calls for a further exploration of how the use of Commission guidance
could be optimized in the future.
4.5 Conclusion and Recommendations
This chapter reveals the dilemma of EU policymakers when faced with the question of
whether or not to provide further guidance to the Member States for the implementation
of EU legislation.On the one hand, the use of Commission guidancemay have unintended
consequences. The issuing of guidance may affect the room of manoeuvre granted to the
Member States, could render indiscernible the division of competences between the
European Commission and national authorities, and may sometimes lead to confusion
and to a complexification rather than to a clarification of EU legislation. On the other
hand, Commission guidance is an appealing implementation tool that enables the European
Commission to address problems related to the implementation of EU legislation. In the
rigid and cumbersome EU legislative system, Commission guidance constitutes an
important instrument that simply makes the EU legal system work. The informal, non-
binding character of Commission guidance can be considered key to its success.
What is more, Commission guidance is likely to becomemore and more important in
the future. Several factors can be identified that invite policymakers to increasingly have
recourse to the issuing of guidance documents. In the first place, due to the democratisation
of legislative processes and despite the better regulation agenda, political compromises are
likely to remain reflected in EU legislative acts. This stresses the need for clarification
through guidance documents. Secondly, the tendency and the political desirability for
more flexibility for the Member States and for a European Union which acts upon ‘big’
rather than on ‘small’matters is likely to lead to a greater demand for guidance from the
European Commission. In practice, public authorities involved in the implementation of
EU law need rules and benchmarks. Often, flexibility and frameworks do not provide the
certainty and predictability that is desired in practice. Thirdly, an increase in the use of
guidance documents is to be expected due to the proactive attitude of the European
Commission regarding the amelioration of the implementation of EU legislation ‘on the
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ground’, and regarding the promotion of the exchange and dissemination of best practices.
Indeed, the use of guidance documents enables the European Commission to show that
it is involved with the problems encountered at the national level, and to avoid being
accused of leaving the Member States ‘stumbling in the dark’. This proactive attitude is,
moreover, likely to trigger more requests for guidance from the Member States.
This development, suggesting the growing importance of guidance documents, raises
some legal questions. What does the increase in the use of informal rules mean for the
character of the EU legal order? Does the increase of Commission guidance trigger a
‘guidance culture’, and how does this culture relate to the rule of law that is fundamental
to the EU project? Where to find the right balance between the informal and the formal
sphere, whilst acknowledging the importance of the coexistence of both worlds?
The growing importance of guidance documents is not only challenging and relevant
from a theoretical point of view, but also and perhaps all the more from a practical and
empirical point of view. In the first place, it points to the need to have further insights into
the actual role played by guidance documents in practice in various policy areas. Therefore,
in order to unravel the role of guidance documents in practice, it is worth considering
whether guidance documents need to be subjected to the Fitness Check.69 The Fitness
Check involves an evaluation of existing EU interventions, and assesses whether the
interventions brought about the expected changes or whether there are unintended effects
or consequences.70 Existing guidance documents should be identified and analyzed to see
whether they are ‘fit for purpose’, especially in policy areas where guidance documents
play an important but often ‘invisible’ role.
Secondly, the proliferation of guidance documents invites a rethink of their usage in
the future. Indeed, it is EU policymakers who ultimately face the question of whether and
how to act.71Amore thought through and principled approach towards the use of guidance
documents could ‘guide’ policymakers when facing this question. Furthermore, such a
principled approach could enhance the legitimacy of the use of guidance documents.
In order for criteria and principles to be developed, inspiration could be drawn from
the better regulation agenda and principles. However, this does not necessarily mean that
guidance documents should be subjected to the requirements of the better legislation
agenda, such as the obligation to conduct an impact assessment. Making guidance docu-
ments subject to heavy better regulation requirements risks adding to the already rigid
character of the EU legal framework, whilst downplaying the informal character of guidance
documents. Due to this informal nature guidance documents have an important role to
69 The better regulation guidelines provide for the possibility to include Commission guidance in the Fitness
Check. See European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2015)111 final, 19 May 2015, p. 50
and n. 59.
70 Id., p. 49 and p. 50
71 Id., p 4.
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play in holding together the EU legal system. An ‘impact assessment light’ approach,
whereby the advantages and the potential risks of guidance are identified and balanced on
a case-by-case basis, could strike the right balance and lead to the ‘smart’ use of guidance
documents without imposing overly stringent procedural requirements.
In conclusion, despite the potential unintended consequences that perhaps cannot be
fully ruled out, Commission guidance documents can be considered an important and
necessary informal implementation tool that complements the EU legislative framework.
What is more, in view of the Dutch presidency’s priority of promoting the simplification
of EU legislation,72 issuing guidance documents in line with the principled approach out-
lined here, could even be encouraged in order to enable an informal dialogue and to provide
for the necessary clarity and uniformity in implementation processes.
72 See for instance the letter fromMinister Koenders, supra n. 10, p. 2.
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